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This is a compilation of my lecture notes for diﬀerent courses. The choice of topics and the way
I present them is inﬂuenced by my own personal opinions. It probably contains a few mistakes. It is
not suﬃcient.to understand the papers it covers.
Nevertheless, it is useful for my teaching. If you have any comments, suggestions or if you spot
any mistakes (or typos), please let me know. If you ﬁnd it useful for teaching or studying, I will be
very glad if you use it and send me an email to let me know.
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21 Currency crises: models
1.1 The ﬁrst generation models of currency crises
Salant and Henderson (1978) showed that if the government uses a stockpile of an ex-
haustible resource (e.g., gold) to stabilize its price, eventually a speculative attack will
occur: the private investors will suddenly acquire the entire government’s stock.
Paul Krugman (1979) showed that if a pegged exchange rate cohexists with budget
deﬁcits that need to be ﬁnanced by money creation, the argument in Salant and Henderson
(1978) also applies: a speculative attack will force the government to abandon the pegged
regime.
Flood and Garber (1984) develops the concept of “shadow exchange rate” and provide
two linear examples of the logic presented by Krugman (1979). This notes covers the
deterministic model of that paper. The stochastic model of Flood and Garber (1984) is
also interesting.
1.1.1 Flood and Garber (1984)
In the non-stochastic version of Flood and Garber (1984), the exchange rate is initially
pegged at ¯ S. Money demand depends negatively on interest rates:
Mt
Pt
= a0 − a1it (1)
Money supply equals foreign currency reserves (Rt) plus domestic credit (Dt).
Mt = Rt + Dt (2)
Domestic credit is expanding:
˙ Dt = µ,µ>0 (3)
Interest rate parity (IRP) and purchasing power parity (PPP) are also assumed (i∗
t
and P∗










Initially, the government has a positive stock of reserves and will keep the peg until
reserves reach a given minimum level (say, until Rt =0 ). Before the peg is abandoned,
˙ S =0 .B yP P P( e q u a t i o n4 ) ,˙ P =0 , and by IRP (equation 5), it is constant, equal i∗
t.
3Therefore Mt is also constant (equation 1). Deﬁne MH as the demand for money while




=( a0 − a1i
∗
t) (6)
In the model, the expansion of domestic credit generates loss of reserves until the
moment in which the peg is abandoned. Then, it leads to an increasing trend in the
money supply and, consequently, inﬂation. Therefore, after the peg is abandoned, the
demand for real balances is smaller because the nominal interest rate is higher, due to
inﬂation (equations 5 and 1). An arbitrage condition implies that Pt and St cannot jump
up, and so the discrete reduction in money demand translates in a discrete fall of Mt.
Initially, reserves are falling steadily, at a rate µ.W h e nRt is exactly equal to the diﬀerence
in money demand in both regimes, all agents exchange part of their domestic currency
for foreign currency and the government is forced to abandon the peg. Deﬁne ML as the

















Now, deﬁne the shadow exchange rate (˜ St) as the exchange rate that would prevail if
the currency was allowed to ﬂoat (demand for real balances would be mL)a n df o r e i g n
reserves vanished (so that Mt = Dt). PPP implies that Pt = P∗














As Flood and Garber (1984) show, a speculative attack forces the abandonment of the
peg exactly when ˜ St = ¯ S.
T h es i z eo ft h ea t t a c k In Flood and Garber (1984), a speculative attack is an instan-
taneous event: agents exchange some of their local currency for foreign currency (M falls)
and deplete the Central Bank stock of reserves (R falls to 0). What is the lost in reserves?
Right before the attack, we have:
M
H = ¯ S.P
∗
t .(a0 − a1i
∗
t) (10)










P = S 
t
As the demand for 
real balances falls, 
if P is not to jump, 



















Subtracting (11) from (10), we get:
∆M = M
H − M





As Mt = Rt +Dt, ∆M = ∆R +∆D. Domestic credit is growing continuously. There-
fore, Dt is the same right before and right after the devaluation (∆D =0 ). So, ∆M = ∆R:










Interpreting the above equations: the fall in reserves corresponds to the fall in the
demand for money. The fall in the demand for money is due to inﬂation post-devaluation.
Inﬂation occurs because the Central Bank has run out of reserves (so cannot ﬁnance the
ﬁscal authority by selling reserves anymore) and thus starts to ﬁnance the ﬁscal authority
via inﬂation.
Some take home points
• Inconsistency between domestic policy and exchange rate policy leads to speculative
attacks. Increases in D lead either to decreases in R (reserves dwindle) or to increases
in M (monetary expansion, that leads to inﬂation). Loss of reserves can’t go forever
(stock of reserves available to Central Banks is ﬁnite). At some point, increases in
D lead to increases in M.
• A simple demand for money relation, arbitrage in all markets (PPP, IRP) and the
increase in domestic credit lead to agents massively sell domestic currency and force
the abandonment of the peg.
• A massive speculative attack is not incompatible with rational agents.
• What to do about speculative attacks? The model seems to say: “don’t shoot the
messenger!”
• The model predicts that crises are predictable, antecipated.
• Inﬂation follows the currency crises.
However...
European Exchange Rate Mechanism, 1993:t h eb a r ki nt h ed a r kt h a tw a sn o th e a r d
(Obstfeld, 1996).
61.2 The second generation models of currency crises
The weak links between changes in economic variables and speculative attacks in some re-
cent episodes (e.g., the ERM crises in 1992-3 and the contagion of 1997-8) have stimulated
the idea that bad fundamentals may be a pre-condition for a crisis, but its occurrence and
timing are somewhat random events. The so called second generation models of currency
crisis formalize this view. This literature points out that if fundamentals are not good
enough, the optimal strategy for an agent in a currency crisis game depends on expecta-
tions: if everybody is expected to attack the currency, it is optimal to attack it, but if
everybody is expected to refrain from doing so, then not attacking is the optimal choice.
Those models present multiple equilibria. Sudden and exogenous shifts on expectations





R = R* + Exp(∆S/S) 




A second generation model of currency needs:
1. A reason why the government want to abandon its ﬁxed exchange rate regime,
72. A reason why the government want to keep its ﬁxed exchange rate regime,
3. Cost of defending the ﬁxed exchange rate regime must be increasing in expectations
of devaluation.




Benefit of keeping the fixed 
exchange rate regime 
Cost of keeping the fixed 
exchange rate regime 
What are the beneﬁts of keeping the ﬁxed exchange rate regime?
• Removing volatility of the exchange rate regime is good for trade, investment.
• Nominal anchor - inﬂation.
• Reputation.
What are the costs of keeping the ﬁxed exchange rate regime? (See Obstfeld, 1996)
• Increases in the interest rate may slow down economy, increase unemployment.
• Distribution eﬀects: hikes in the interest rate make mortgages more expensive, bond
holders wealthier, indebted companies poorer.
• Banks may suﬀer when interest rates increases (we will discuss this issue further in
a couple of weeks).
• If a country is highly indebted, its ﬁscal burden increases if expectations of a deval-
uation push up interest rates.
• Government may want to inﬂate away its debt.
8Why would the costs of keeping the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m eb ei n c r e a s i n g :
• The higher is the expected devaluation, the higher is the hike in the interest rates.
• Seeing from a diﬀerent perspective, if one expects a currency to depreciate, he/she
will sell it (or short it). The pressure for devaluation is proportional to this amount
sold (or short) as the government will have to buy it or to increase incentives (interest
rates) for others to hold it.
1.2.1 Obstfeld (1996)
As government’s decision depends on how many agents attack the currency, self-fulﬁlling
crises may occur. Everybody expects that the peg will be abandoned, so everybody attacks
the currency. And the peg is abandoned because everybody attacked the currency. This
kind of circular logic is characteristic of the second generation models of currency crises.
A simple example from Obstfeld (EER 1996) helps to clarify this point: a government
that wants to ﬁx its currency and two private holders of domestic currency who can sell
it (attack the currency) or hold it (not attack). The government has R reserves to defend
the peg. Each trader has domestic money resources of 6 which can be sold for reserves.
To sell and take a position against the government, there is a cost of 1 (assumed to be
irrespective of the amout sold, but that is not important for the results). In the event of
giving up its peg, the government devalues by 50 percent (so, the traders get 1/2 unit of
money for each unit they bought in the event of a successful attack).
The “high-reserve” game: R =2 0
Trader 2
AN
Trader 1 A −1, −1 −1,0
N 0, −1 0,0
The “low-reserve” game: R =6
Trader 2
AN
Trader 1 A 1/2, 1/2 2,0
N 0, 2 0,0
The “intermediate-reserve” game: R =1 0
9Trader 2
AN
Trader 1 A 3/2, 3/2 −1,0
N 0, −1 0,0
Take home points
• There are self-fulﬁlling crises in a model with very rational investors.
• Sunspots, events completely disconnected from the economy, may change expecta-
tions and trigger a currency crisis.
• Fixed exchange rate regimes that would work well in the absence of the speculative
attack may fall without major fundamental imbalances.
• There are strategic complementarities between agents’ actions: incentives for an agent
to attack the currency are increasing in the share of agents that choose to attack the
currency.
• Crises are not fully predictable.
However...
• Assumption that agents know what others are doing in equilibrium is very strong (is
it?)
• Expectations are given exogenously in the model. How would you form your own
expectations about what other players would do? Compare it with your own decision
i nt h eg a m ep l a y e di nc l a s s .
1.2.2 A side point: eﬀects of increases in R∗
The eﬀect of an increase in foreign interest rates (R∗) can also be seen at ﬁgure ?? If R∗
increases...
In 1994, the US Federal Reserve Bank sharply increased interest rates. Interest rates in
Mexico had to follow. Clearly, that increases the cost of keeping the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime for the Mexican government. The currency crises occurred in December 1994.
101.3 Expectations and higher order beliefs
1.3.1 The common knowledge assumption
If an event (say θ>0) is common knowledge, then everybody knows it, everybody knows
that everybody knows it, everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows
it, everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows
it, and so on.
It is not easy to see why that would be diﬀerent from the simple “everybody knows
it”. The example in Geanakoplos (1992, page 54) illustrates the strenght of the common
knowledge hypothesis.
1.3.2 Beauty contests
Consider the following game:
Player 2
AN
Player 1 A θ, θ θ − 1,0
N 0, θ − 1 0,0
If θ ∈ (0,1), the game has 2 Nash Equilibria: (A,A) and (N,N).W h a t w o u l d y o u
choose?
The optimal choice depends on the probability attached to the other agent choosing
A. Let’s denote this probability by p,t h a ti s ,p =P r ( s2 = A). Then, my payoﬀ from
choosing A is:
π(s1 = A)=p.θ +( 1− p).(θ − 1)
= p + θ − 1
So, A is the optimal choice if:
p>1 − θ
A natural question is: what does p depend on? What is the probability that the other
player will choose A? Naturally, that depends on the probability player 2 assigns for
player 1 choosing A...
Keynes, in the “General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” (1936) wrote
that: “...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the
prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average
preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those
11faces which he himself ﬁnds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same
point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgement, are
really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who
practise the fourth, ﬁfth and higher degrees.”
In a Nash equilibrium, an agent knows which action the other players will be choosing.
So, the above mentioned reasoning is not incorporated in the second generation models
of currency crises.
1.3.3 The model with incomplete information
Carlsson and Van Damme (Econometrica, 1993) show that multiplicity of equilibrium
comes from two modelling assumptions:
• In equilibrium, agents know what others will do;
• All information is common knowledge.
What happens when we remove those assumptions and agents are uncertain about
what others will do? An agent has to estimate the likelihood of other players attacking
the currency. So, they try to assess the others’ information – what do they know? what
are they expecting? Like in the beauty contest example, an agent is guessing what the
others guess that she knows.
Consider that agents are playing the same game they played before:
Player 2
AN
Player 1 A θ, θ θ − 1,0
N 0, θ − 1 0,0
However, θ is not observed. The only information agents have about θ is a noisy signal
x. Formally, the prior on θ is uniformly distributed in the real line (or think of a normal
distribution with σ →∞ ) For each agent i:
xi = θ +  i
The error term,  i, is independent accross agents. The striking result ﬁrst proved by
Carlsson and Van Damme is that the above game has a unique equilibrium even if the
12variance of the error term is very small – for example, even if  i is distributed uniformly
between -0.01 and 0.01, that is:  i ∼ U(−0.01,0.01).
1.3.4 Unique equilibrium: an intuition
Suppose that  i ∼ N(0,σ).
From the point of view of agent 1, that got signal x1
• θ ∼ N(x1,σ).
• x2 ∼ N(x1,
√
2σ). (Why? From the point of view of agent 1, θ ∼ N(x1,σ).a n d
x2 ∼ N(θ,σ), so...)
The expected payoﬀ from choosing A for an agent that got signal x1 is:
E(π(s1 = A)) = p + x1 − 1
Dominant regions
• If x<0, E(π(s1 = A)) <p− 1 < 0. Regardless of what player 2 is choosing, player
1 is better oﬀ by choosing N.
• If x>1, E(π(s1 = A)) >p>0. Regardless of what player 2 is choosing, player 1 is
better oﬀ by choosing A.
Now, what if 0 <x<1? Suppose for example that σ =0 .1.
If x1 =0 .1, what is the probability that agent 2 will play A?



















where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. So, with probability
0.24, agent 2 got a signal smaller than 0 and will play N. If agent 2’s signal is positive,
w ed o n ’ tk n o ww h a th ew i l ld o ,b u tw ec a ns a yt h a t :
p<0.76
So, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ of attacking is:
E(π(s1 = A)) < 0.76 + 0.1 − 1=−0.14
so, agent 1 will not attack.
13Using a similar argument, if x1 =0 .9,t h e n :



















So, with probability 0.24, agent 2 got a signal bigger than 1 and will play A.I fa g e n t
2’s signal is smaller than 1, we don’t know what he will do, but we can say that:
p>0.24
So, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ of attacking is:
E(π(s1 = A)) > 0.26 + 0.9 − 1=0 .14
so, agent 1 will attack.
Now, suppose that x1 =0 .2. Then the probability that agent 1 gets a signal smaller
than 0 is just 0.08. If all we can say is that p<92, then we cannot say anything about
agent 1’s optimal decision in this case because
E(π(s1 = A)) = p + x1 − 1 ⇒
E(π(s1 = A)) < 0.92 + 0.2 − 1=0 .12
that is, from this calculation, we can’t tell whether E(π(s1 = A)) is positive or negative.
How can agent 1 decide in this case?
Agent 2 is also rational and is doing the same calculations agent 1 is doing. Therefore,
a g e n t1k n o w st h a ti fx2 =0 .10, agent 2 will not attack. Why is that? If agent 2 got
signal x2 =0 .10, he will consider that the probability that agent 1 got a negative signal
is 0.24 and will not attack. Agent 1 knows that. And given that his signal x1 =0 .20,h e
knows that agent 2 will have got a signal x2 ≤ 0.10 with probability 0.24 because:












So, he knows that p<0.76 and therefore, agent 1’s expected payoﬀ of attacking is:
E(π(s1 = A)) < 0.76 + 0.2 − 1=−0.04
E(π(s1 = A)) is negative! If x1 =0 .2,a g e n t1w i l lc h o o s eN.
Now, suppose that we know that players 1 and 2 choose N if x ≤ xL,f o rs o m exL.
14Suppose x1 = xL + η,w h e r eη is a positive and very small constant, η< <σ .
Then:
Pr(x2 ≤ xL)=P r
µ
x2 − x1 √
2σ
≤












p =P r ( s2 = A) ≤ 1 − Pr(x2 ≥ xL)
≤ 0.5
Then,
E(π(s1 = A)) = p + x1 − 1
≤ x1 − 0.5
Therefore, we can iteratively delete s = A whenever x1 < 0.5.
At the other side, suppose that we know that players 1 and 2 choose A if x ≥ xH,f o r
some xH.
Suppose x1 = xH − η,w h e r eη is a positive and very small constant, η< <σ .
Then:
Pr(x2 ≥ xH)=P r
µ
x2 − x1 √
2σ
≥












p =P r ( s2 = A) ≥ Pr(x2 ≥ xH)
≥ 0.5
Then,
E(π(s1 = A)) = p + x1 − 1
≥ x1 − 0.5
Therefore, we can iteratively delete s = N whenever x1 > 0.5.
So, the unique equilibrium that survives strategically elimination of strictly dominated
strategies is:
15• si = A if xi > 0.5
• si = N if xi < 0.5
The argument works in the same way even if the support of ε is bounded, for example,
even if  i ∼ U(−0.01,0.01). Note the higher order beliefs in action: if you get a low signal
(say x =0 .05) you will end up playing N even though you know that θ is positive and
you know that the other player knows that θ is positive. That is because he may think
that you may think that he may think that ........ that θ is negative. Although agents
in this case know that θ>0,s ot h e(A,A) equilibrium would yield positive payoﬀsf o r
them, that is not common knowledge.
1.3.5 Morris and Shin (1998)
Morris and Shin (1998), building on Carlsson and Van Damme (Econometrica, 1993),
endogenize expectations in a model of currency attacks.
Consider an economy with a continuum of players and denote by l the proportion of
players that choose to attack. The government has a constant beneﬁt for holding the peg
and a cost that depends negatively on fundamentals (θ) and positively on the proportion
of agents that choose to attack (l). We will consider that the cost will exceed the beneﬁt
if l − θ>0. So, the government abandons the peg if l>θ .
The information structure is as before (xi = θ+ i). An agent chooses between ‘attack’
(A)a n d‘ n o ta t t a c k ’( N). If the agent chooses N, she does not win or lose anything, her
payoﬀ is 0 regardless of what others do. The cost of attacking is t. If she attacks and
there is a devaluation, she gets 1. So, if she chooses A,h e rp a y o ﬀ if 1 − t i st h e r ei sa
devaluation and −t otherwise. Suppose that  i ∼ N(0,σ).
Here, if θ is negative, the government abandons the peg regarless of what agents do
and if θ>1, the peg if kept even if all agents decide to attack. The agent will attack the
currency if she perceives that fundamentals are weak, that is, only if she thinks that θ is
small.
The model with common knowledge of fundamentals Suppose for a while that all agents
observe θ. Then, the model is a second generation model.
S u p p o s ee v e r y o n ea t t a c k st h ec u r r e n c y( l =1 ). Then the government abandons the
peg if θ<1. In this case, it is optimal for an agent to attack the currency if θ<1.
Suppose that noone attacks the currency (l =0 ). The the government abandons the
peg if θ<0. In this case, it is optimal for an agent not to attack the currency if θ>0.
16Thus, if θ<0, fundamentals are too weak, everybody attacks the currency and the
government leave the peg. If θ>1, nobody attacks and the peg survives. But if 0 <θ<1,
both equilibria exist.
The model with imperfect information about θ Now, let’s return to the case when θ is
not observed and agents have just imperfect information about it.
Morris and Shin (1998) show that there is a unique equilibrium, characterized by two
thresholds:
1. an agent attacks only if her signal xi is smaller than x∗.
2. the government abandons the exchange rate peg only if θ<θ
∗.
2 conditions pin down the equilibrium:
1. An agent who gets signal x∗ is indiﬀerent between attacking or not attacking.
2. When θ = θ
∗, the fraction of agents that attack the currency is just enough to make
the government abandon the peg.
A na g e n tt h a tg e t ss i g n a lx∗ asks himself: what is the probability that the attack will
succeed?
• The question is: what is the probability that θ<θ
∗?
• From that agent’s point of view, θ ∼ N(x∗,σ).S a y i n gd i ﬀerently, θ = x∗ −  i.
• So, Pr(θ<θ
∗)=P r ( x∗ −  i <θ
∗)=P r ( − i <θ
∗ − x∗)=P r (  i <θ







where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
So, The expected payoﬀ of attaking is:



















) − t =0 (12)
The second equilibrium condition: when θ = θ
∗, the fraction of agents that attack the
currency is just enough to make the government abandon the peg. But when θ = θ
∗,
what is the proportion of agents that choose to attack?
17• As we have many agents, the question is: what is the proportion of agents that get
as i g n a lx such that x<x ∗?
• If θ = θ
∗, x = θ
∗ +  i.
• So, Pr(x<x ∗)=P r ( θ
∗ +  i <x ∗)=P r (  i <x ∗ − θ







When θ = θ
∗, the cost and the beneﬁto fg o v e r n m e n tk e e p i n gt h ep e ga r et h es a m e .
So:
















So, the two equilibrium conditions (equations 12 and 13) yield:
1 − θ




1.3.6 A few take home points
• If agents are trying to guess what others are trying to do in a currency crises situation,
expectations are crucial for the ﬁnal outcome but are not disconnected from economic
fundamentals.
• In this simple model, expectations depend only on prices (t) and fundamentals (θ).
However, more elaborated models using this technique are able to show other in-
teresting features of expectations (for example, the eﬀect of public information in
crises).
1.4 Rational herd behavior
1.4.1 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)
H e r eIg ot h r o u g ht h em o d e la ts e c t i o n2o fB H Ww i t has l i g h tm o d i ﬁcation: BHW assume
that if the agent is indiﬀerent, she will adopt either action with probability 50%. I will
assume that if the agent is indiﬀerent, he will follow its own signal. It makes no diﬀerence
in the general message but simpliﬁes the algebra a bit.
18Suppose agent 1 receives signal H (without loss of generality). Then, from his point
of view:
Pr(V =1 |H)=p
Pr(V =0 |H)=1− p
Since p>0.5, he chooses to adopt. Thus, the following players know he has got signal
H.
Suppose agent 2 receives signal H. From her point of view:
Pr((V =1 ) |(H,H)) =
Pr((V =1 )∩ (H,H))
Pr((H,H) ∩ (V = 0)) + Pr((H,H) ∩ (V =1 ) )
So:














2,s h ec h o o s e st oadopt. If she receives signal L, then, from her point of
view:


















She is indiﬀerent. So, according to my tie-breaking convention, she follows her own
signal and decides to reject – in the paper, due to their tie-breaking rules, she takes
either action with 50% probability.
Now, consider agent 3. If agents 1 and 2 have taken diﬀerent actions. Agent 3 knows
that they have got diﬀerent signals. Thus, before agent 3 sees her own signal, she thinks
that: Pr(V =0 )=P r ( V =1 )=1
2.S o ,t h eg a m ei sa si nt h eb e g i n n i n g .
What if agent 1 and 2 have both decided to adopt? Agent 3 knows that both have
received signal H. If she also receives signal H, she will also decide to adopt, as from
her point of view, Pr(V =1 )> Pr(V =0 )– is it clear for you without doing the
calculations? But what if she receives signal L? Then, she will think: “3 signals, 2 H and
1 L. Which is more likely: (V =0 )or (V =1 ) ?”













2, she chooses to adopt, although she got signal L. The intuition is:
more signals pointing to (V =1 )makes (V =1 )more likely.
What will agent 4 do? She knows that agent 3 would adopt anyway, so agent 3’s action
is uninformative. She knows that agents 1 and 2 have received signal H. Thus, she is in
the same situation of agent 3 and will adopt regardless of her signal. Do I need to repeat
this spiel for agent 5?
That characterizes an information cascade. Agents act regardless of their own infor-
mation, not because they are crazy but precisely because they are rational – they extract
information from others’ actions instead of ignoring it.
A key (and interesting) feature of the equilibrium is that agents may observe many
others moving before them, but only the actions of the ﬁrst ones are informative. The
others are just following the herd. So, the information they had is not passed ahead.
Discussion of the key assumptions:
• Action: 0 or 1. If there was a continuous set of actions and agents’ optimal action de-
pended on the probability they assigned to true value being 1, everybody would infer
the signal received by an agent from her action. Thus, there will be no information
cascade: individuals would always consider their own information and eventually the
true state would be known.
• Exogenous order of movements (which can be relaxed, see Caplin and Leahy, 1994)
• My signal and your signal have (almost) the same weight in my decisions. What do
you think of this assumption? Is it rational?
But let’s be careful: conformity of behavior does not need to imply an informational
cascade.
Examples:
• If my payoﬀ d e p e n d so ny o u ra c t i o n s ,w em a yc h o o s et h es a m ea c t i o nd u et ot h e
strategic complementarities discussed above, not because of herding.
• Conformity of behavior may be related to preferences: my willingness to go to a
party may be an increasing function of the others’ decisions.
• Following that idea, suppose that you work for an asset management company. If
you lost money in Asia and all your peers did the same, or if you all proﬁtf r o m
investing there, this is business as usual for you. If you are the only one that lost
20money there, your job may be in danger. On the other hand, if you are the only one
that got it right, you may get an extra bonus. However, you may prefer the former
safe choice to the latter risky lottery, so it may be rational for you to mimic market
behavior.
1.5 Banking crises and moral hazard
1.5.1 The moral hazard eﬀect
T h eg a m e :‘ h e a d sIw i n ,t a i l st h et a x p a y e r e sl o s e ’ :
Suppose that there is a potential investment that will cost $70 million up front. If all
goes well, the project will yield $90 million. That will occur with probability 1/2.B u t
with probabilty 1/2, the return will only be $30 million. The expected payoﬀ then is
(1/2 × $90m)+( 1 /2 × $30m)=$ 6 0million. Ordinarily, this investment would never be
made.
However, bailout garantees change the result. Suppose that an investor is able to
borrow the entire $60 million because everyone (including him and the lenders) knows
that the government will protect them if his project fails and he cannot repay. Then,
from his point of view, he will make $20 million (=$ 9 0 m − $70m) with probability half
and walk away with nothing with probability half.
The solution seems to be simple: the government cannot bailout such projects. But that
is not simple. Diaz-Alejandro (1985), studies the example of Chile in the 80’s. “Good-
bye ﬁnancial repression, hello ﬁnancial crash”, that is what happened. Lots of bank
regulations were removed with the aim of ending ﬁnancial repression and the government
of Chile had pledged not to bail-out banks if they crashed. However...
The externality A bank is a borrower and a lender. Its assets are bonds, loans, other
ﬁnancial assets. Its liabilities are loans, bonds and other ﬁnancial instruments. If a bank
crashes and it cannot pay its debts, its bankrupcy can lead to the failure of other banks
and companies – it may be the ﬁrst domino to fall – because its liabilities are other
banks and companies assets.
So, bailing-out a failing bank is costly. But not bailing-out may be worse, due to the
negative externalities spread to the rest of the economy.
The credibility issue Consider the game shown at ﬁgure 4.
Players:
21Figure 4: The game
not 
bail-out
½ - bad  good - ½  
careful  risky  careful  risky 
N
A  A
G  (1,0) 
(3,0)  (1,0) 
(0,-5) (-10,-10) 
• N: nature,
• A: agent (banks, big companies, lenders...),
• G: government.
When the government says: “I will not bail out insolvent banks/companies”, the gov-
ernment is saying: “I will play not”. If the government is indeed playing not, the agent
gets payoﬀ of 1 if he plays careful and expected payoﬀ of -3.5 if he plays risky.T h u s ,t h e
agent playing careful and the government playing not is a Nash equilibrium: nobody has
any incentive to deviate.
However, this Nash equilibrium is not credible (it is not a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium). If we get into a situation in which the government is called to action,
choosing not yields -10, while choosing bail-out yields -5. None is great, but bail-out
causes less damage. So, that is what the government chooses. Now, the agent knows this,
the threat of not bailing-out is not credible. Thus, the agent gets payoﬀ of 1 if he plays
careful and expected payoﬀ of 1.5 if he plays risky. Thus, the agent plays risky and, in
the event of a bad state of nature, hello ﬁnancial crash.
The key assumption in this game is that, once a banking crisis takes place, the payoﬀ
22of not bailing out the banks is smaller than the payoﬀ of helping them. Diaz Alejandro
(1985) argues that is true in reality: promises to play not at the last node are not credible.
Policy implication: regulation, ex-ante actions are needed.
1.5.2 The Asian crisis of 1997
Many analysts have considered that moral hazard – the game ‘heads I win, tails the
taxpayers lose’ – played an important role in the Asian crisis of 1997. The paragraphs
below are taken from Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), with minor changes.
“In interpreting the Asian meltdown, one should consider three diﬀerent, yet strictly
interrelated dimensions of the moral hazard problem at the corporate, ﬁnancial, and
international level. At the corporate level, political pressures to maintain high rates of
economic growth had led to a long tradition of public guarantees to private projects,
some of which were eﬀectively undertaken under government control, directly subsidized,
or supported by policies of directed credit to favored ﬁrms and/or industries. In light
of the record of past government intervention, the production plans and strategies of
the corporate sector largely overlooked costs and riskiness of the underlying investment
projects. With ﬁnancial and industrial policy enmeshed within a widespread business
sector network of personal and political favoritism, and with governments that appeared
willing to intervene in favor of troubled ﬁrms, markets operated under the impression that
the return on investment was somewhat ‘insured’ against adverse shocks.
Such pressures and beliefs accompanied a sustained process of capital accumulation, re-
sulting into persistent and sizable current account deﬁcits. While common wisdom holds
that borrowing from abroad to ﬁnance domestic investment should not raise concerns
about external solvency — it could actually be the optimal course of action for under-
capitalized economies with good investment opportunities — the evidence for the Asian
countries in the mid-1990s highlights that the proﬁtability of new investment projects was
low.
Investment rates and capital inﬂo w si nA s i ar e m a i n e dh i g he v e na f t e rt h en e g a t i v e
signals sent by the indicators of proﬁtability. Consistent with the ﬁnancial side of the
moral hazard problem in Asia, the crucial factor underlying the sustained investment rates
was excessive borrowing by national banks abroad, corresponding to high and excessive
investment at home. Financial intermediation played a key role in channeling funds toward
projects that were marginal if not outright unproﬁtable.
The adverse consequences of these distortions were crucially magniﬁed by the rapid
process of capital account liberalization and ﬁnancial market deregulation in the region
23during the 1990s, which increased the supply-elasticity of funds from abroad. The exten-
sive liberalization of capital markets was consistent with the policy goal of providing a
large supply of low-cost funds to national ﬁnancial institutions and the domestic corporate
sector. The same goal motivated exchange rate policies aimed at reducing the volatility
of the domestic currency in terms of the US dollar, thus lowering the risk premium on
dollar-denominated debt.
The international dimension of the moral hazard problem hinged upon the behavior
of international banks, which over the period leading to the crisis had lent large amounts
of funds to the region’s domestic intermediaries, with apparent neglect of the standards
for sound risk assessment. Underlying such overlending syndrome may have been the
presumption that short-term interbank cross-border liabilities would be eﬀectively guar-
anteed by either a direct government intervention in favor of the ﬁnancial debtors, or by
an indirect bailout through IMF support programs. A very large fraction of foreign debt
accumulation was in the form of bank-related short-term, unhedged, foreign-currency de-
nominated liabilities: by the end of 1996, a share of short-term liabilities in total liabilities
above 50% was the norm in the region. Moreover, the ratio of short-term external liabil-
ities to foreign reserves — a widely used indicator of ﬁnancial fragility — was above 100%
in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.”
The banking crisis and Flood and Garber (1984) What is the link between the banking
crisis and the currency crisis? Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) say:
“To satisfy solvency, the government must then undertake appropriate domestic ﬁscal
reforms, possibly involving recourse to seigniorage revenues through money creation (that
means, inﬂation, increase in P,t h a tl e a d st ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ed e v a l u a t i o n ) .S p e c u l a t i o n
in the foreign exchange market, driven by expectations of inﬂationary ﬁnancing, causes
a collapse of the currency and anticipates the event of a ﬁnancial crisis. Financial and
currency crises thus become indissolubly interwoven in an emerging economy characterized
by weak cyclical performances, low foreign exchange reserves, and ﬁnancial deﬁciencies
eventually resulting into high shares of non-performing loans.”
In Flood and Garber (1984), the speculative attack results from expectations of in-
ﬂationary ﬁnancing. This pushes up the “shadow exchange rate” (in Flood and Garber,
as PPP is assumed, that occurs instantaneously) and that leads to a speculative attack.
Here, expectations of money creation come not through the expansion of domestic credit
but from the fragility of the economy and the banking system (they point the expectations
of bail-outs as key factor for that).
24Other analysts will argue that those Asian countries had not bad economic fundamen-
tals and that a self-fulﬁlling crisis in the form described by the second generation models
happened. Radelet and Sachs (1998) is a well known example of a paper defending such
view.
1.6 Contagion
There is large evidence that a crisis in a country makes other countries more subject to
crises. The Mexican crisis in the end of 1994 had large impacts in other Latin American
countries, especially in Argentina. The Asian crisis started in Thailand in July/1997
and was spread to many other countries in Southern Asia. Latin American countries
were also aﬀected (the Asian Flu). The Russian crisis in 1998 also had strong impacts
in other developing countries like Brazil and Mexico (the Russian virus). The Brazilian
devaluation in 1999 let Argentina in a more fragile position.
What are the possible linkages between countries?
• Trade links.
• Information.
• The magnifying eﬀect of public information.
• Changes in “ﬁrst world” prices: major economic shifts in developed countries may
have strong eﬀects on developing countries. Examples are the impacts in Latin
America of changes in US interest rates and the eﬀects of the devaluation of the Yen
with respect to the dollar in 1995-1996.
• Other ﬁnancial links: if countries are ﬁnancially integrated, it is natural to expect
that a crisis in a country will have eﬀects on the other for the same reason that the
performance of diﬀerent sectors in an economy aﬀect each other.
• Liquidity: I lost money in a country, need to withdraw from some other...
1.6.1 The eﬀect of public information
Let’s look at the magnifying eﬀect of public information.
Consider again the following game:
Player 2
AN
Player 1 A θ, θ θ − 1,0
N 0, θ − 1 0,0
25Suppose that agents do not observe θ. The information agents have about θ is a noisy
private signal xi and a public signal y.F o re a c ha g e n ti:
xi = θ + εi , εi ∼ N(0,σ
2)
and y is the same for all agents:
y = θ + η , η ∼ N(0,σ
2)
The private signal is the result of your own analysis of the economy. The public signal
is in the ﬁrst page of the Financial Times and you are sure that everybody will read it.
For concreteness, let’s suppose an example in which θ =0 .5, x1 =0 .4, x2 =0 .4 and
y =0 .6. Remember that in the case with only private information, agents would be
indiﬀerent when xi =0 .5. The question is: what happens in this case?
From the point of view of agent 1:
• E(θ)=0 .5.
• E(x2)=E(θ + ε2)=E(θ)+E(ε2)=0 .5+0=0 .5
Now, what does agent 1 expect about agent 2’s expected x1?
• Agent 1 considers that agent 2 has 2 pieces of information: x2 and y.
• From the point of view of agent 1, E(x2)=0 .5 and E(y)=0 .6.
• So, E1(E2(x1)) > 0.5 (it is a (weighted) average between 0.5 and 0.6).
Notice that both agents think that θ is 0.5 plus an error term. But both agents think
that the other agent’s estimate of θ is bigger than 0.5.
In this case, agents would be indiﬀerent if all their information were private. But both
expect that the other will attack because the information in the front page of the Financial
Times matters more for what I think that you think.
Notice that here there is no herding: agents are not learning from what others are
doing but trying to infer what others are expecting. Public information matters more
than private information because it has a higher impact on expectations and expectations
matter in a coordination game (as well as in a currency crisis situation).
2 Currency crises: empirics
Currency crises are rare events, so data explicitly relating to them are relatively scarce.
B u tt h a tp r o b l e mm a yb eo v e r c o m eu s i n gﬁnancial price data, which are abundant and
reﬂect expectations about currency devaluations.
262.1 Expectations implicit in ﬁnancial prices
2.1.1 Rose and Svensson (1994)
Rose and Svensson (EER 1994) estimate expectations of changes in the exchange rate
before the ERM crisis in 1992. Key questions are: (i) was the crisis expected? (ii) how
much of the change on expectations are explained by macroeconomic variables? Their
answers are: (i) basically no and (ii) basically nothing.
Measuring credibility Notation: δt is the interest rate diﬀerential between a given country
and Germany and st i st h ee x c h a n g er a t e( p r i c eo faD e u t s c h e m a r ki nd o m e s t i cc u r r e n c y ) .




Now, the exchange rate was allowed to ﬂuctuate inside a band. Thus, s may be written
as s = x + c,w h e r ec is the (log of) the central parity and x denotes deviations of the









They use 2 measures of realignment expectations:
1. measure is δt. It assumes E [∆xt]/∆t =0 .





αi + β.xt + γ.δt + ut0
How to interpret it? g =1 0 %may mean an expected realignment of 10% with hazard
rate 1/year or an expected realignment of 1% with hazard rate 10/year...
Fundamentals? Rose and Svensson try to assess the impacts of macroeconomic funda-
mentals on some macroeconomic variables with:
• a regression of g in a set of macroeconomic variables (with country and time dum-
mies).
• the estimation of a VAR.
They ﬁnd that macroeconomic variables have very little impact on credibility.
27What to take out of this? Positive results would be hard to be explained given the lack of
a structural model and, especially, the endogeneity of many of the regressors. The authors
c l a i mt h a ti ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to dismiss negative results – if there was some important
relation between those macroeconomic variables and the credibility of the exchange rate
parity, their analysis should have detected it.
The analysis is very simple. Both the estimation of credibility and the assessment of
the importance of fundamentals are quite atheoretical. How can it be improved?
2.2 Expectations and option prices
The exchange rate risk in a pegged regime depends on the probability that the peg will
be abandoned and on the expected size of a consequent currency devaluation. To a ﬁrst
order approximation, the forward premium (or the interest rate diﬀerential) is roughly
the product of these two variables. However, observing the forward premium alone does
not permit individual identiﬁcation of the probability of a devaluation and its expected
magnitude: a forward premium of 3% a year may refer to an expected devaluation of 30%
with probability 10% a year, or an expected devaluation of 5% with probability 60% a
year, and so on.
Options are a richer source of data because they provide information about the proba-
bility density of the exchange rate at diﬀerent points. So it is possible to disentangle the
“thickness of the tail of the distribution” (probability of a devaluation) and the “distance
from the tail to the center” (the expected magnitude of a devaluation).
To give a simple intuition for identiﬁcation, suppose the price of an asset tomorrow will
be 1 with probability 1−p and 3 with probability p. In a risk-neutral world, a call option
with strike price 1 costs 2p, a call option with strike price 2 costs p. If the probability of
a devaluation (p) increases, both options get more expensive but the ratio of their prices
remains equal to 2. If the magnitude of the devaluation increases from 3 to 4, the option
with strike price 1 will cost 3p, a call option with strike price 2 will cost 2p –t h er a t i o
changes.
2.2.1 The Black and Scholes model
Before we start studying the options, let’s take a look at the basic asset pricing model.
The Black and Scholes model assumes that the asset follows:
dS
S
= µ.dt + σ.dZ
where:
28• µ is the instantaneous expected return on the asset (ex-dividend);
• σ is the instantaneous variance conditional on no jumps and
• Z is a standard Wiener process;
The B&S model is the benchmark model in ﬁnancial applications. According to the
model, the distribution of returns on an asset is log-normal. The data, however, does not
fully comply with the B&S formula. In particular, the tails of the distribution are too
thick.
The B&S price of an (European) option depends on observed variables (interest rate,
spot value of the asset, strike price, time to maturity) and the volatility. With the price
of an option, we can calculate its implicit volatility. Usually, we observe that the implicit
volatility increases with |S − X|. This generates the so called volatility smiles.
2.2.2 Campa, Chang and Refalo (2002)
Campa, Chang and Refalo (JDE 2002) use options to measure the credibility of Brazilian
exchange rate regime. Among ﬁnancial prices, options are better sources of information on
the expectations about a peg than future prices (or the interest rate diﬀerential) because
their value at maturity is nonzero only if the exchange rate goes beyond a certain level (the
strike price). So, if there is data on options of diﬀerent strike classes, there is information
about the probability density of the exchange rate at diﬀerent points, and it is possible to
uncover more information about the expectations on the path of the exchange rate. For
example, it is possible to identify the probability that the currency peg will be abandoned
and the expected magnitude of a devaluation (conditional on its occurrence). Campa et
al employ a very interesting non-parametric approach (see also Campa and Chang, 1996).
Market expectations and option prices Under risk neutrality, the price of a call with





























A one-dollar increase in the strike price decreases the value of the call by (the present
value of) an amount equal to the probability that the option will ﬁnish “in-the-money”.
The higher the probability the option ﬁnishes in the money, the more likely a one-dollar
increase in the strike price will matter to the option holder and the greater the decrease
in the option price.
Thus, the second partial derivative of the option price with respect to K yields the
probability density function of the exchange rate at date T.
The probability functions derived from option prices are the so called “risk-neutral”
probabilities. They can diﬀer from the real pdf’s due to risk considerations, but never-
theless they reveal important information about expectations about an asset.
Estimation If we had a continuous of options (or, if we had a lot), we could just evaluate
numerically the derivatives. The available data is deﬁnitely not enough for that.
We could do some interpolation (e.g., spline) and calculate the pdf. Problem: the call
prices are not always a convex function (even without interpolation). We do not want
negative pdf’s.
Methodology Campa et al employ: they obtain the implied volatility of each option
as a function of the strike price. That yields a “volatility smile”. Then, they transform
it into a continuous call price function that is twice-diﬀerential in strike – which can
be done either by ﬁtting the implied volatility as a quadratic function or by some cubic
spline interpolation. Having the price of a call option as a continuum function of the
strike prices, we apply the formula and get the densities.
Again, fundamentals? They ask the question: can realignment “intensity” be explained
by the usual macro variables? They regress their measure of intensity of devaluation in a




(ST − ¯ S).f(ST).dST
which implies:
G(T)=C¯ S,T.(1 + iT)
Results: the level of international reserves is the only signiﬁcant variable in the regres-
sion (and it is endogenous). They conclude that results are consistent with past evidence:
“macroeconomic variables are largely unable to explain intertemporal movements in re-
alignment risk”.
30There is no theory behind their regression. Should the macro variables impact proba-
bility, expected magnitude, or both?
2.2.3 Bates (1991)
The question David Bates is asking is: was the crash of ’87 expected? That is: were put
o p t i o n st o oe x p e n s i v ep r i o rt ot h ec r a s h ?
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, Bates examines the skewness of the implicit distri-
bution. He ﬁnds that in the year leading up to the crash the probability of a fall was
higher than the probability of a large increase. I will jump to the second section in which
he presents a model (actually very similar to Merton, 1976) and estimates its parameters
implicit in the prices of options.
The model The asset (in this speciﬁc case, the S&P 500 index) is assumed to follow:
dS
S
=( µ − λ.k).dt + σ.dZ + k.dq
where:
• µ is the instantaneous expected return on the asset (ex-dividend);
• σ is the instantaneous variance conditional on no jumps;
• Z is a standard Wiener process;
• k is the random percentage jump conditional on its occurrence. It is lognormally
distributed:




— E(k) ≡ ¯ k = eγ − 1
• λ is the hazard rate of the Poisson event and
• dq is the Poisson counter: Pr(dq =1 )=λ.dt
His proposition 2 shows that contingent claims are priced as if investors were risk-
neutral and the asset price followed a similar jump diﬀu s i o n( p a g e1 0 2 5 )w i t hd i ﬀerent
parameters. Saying diﬀerently, by estimating the above model, we are obtaining the
risk-adjusted parameters.
31Figure 5:
The asset follows a Black and Scholes diﬀusion path almost all the time. Sometimes,
a Poisson event happens (hazard rate is λ)a n dt h e r ei sad i s c r e t ej u m p .
The parameters of this model are:
• the volatility σ;
• the hazard rate λ;
• the mean of the jump γ;a n d
• the standard deviation of the jump δ.
How changes in each parameter changes the distribution of probability of an European
option:
• σ: increases standard deviation of the no-jump scenario;
• λ: increases the weight of the jump scenario;
• γ: pushes the part of the pdf that refers to the sump scenario further away from the
no-jump scenario;
• δ: increases standard deviation of the jump scenario.
32How each pararameter inﬂuences the prices of call options?
Estimation The model yields a closed form solution for the price of a call option (equation
11 in the paper). Then, it is assumed that the observed price of an option equals the
corresponding model price plus an additive distrubance term (it could be a multiplicative
error term also, both have some inconveniences).
Then, a cross-sectional data sample with identical maturities was used and implicit
parameters were estimated via non-linear least squares for all days in the sample. The
parameters are not constrained to be constant over time.
Results It is hard to argue that the estimation succeeded in making a clear distinction
between the probability and the expected magnitude of the devaluation (ﬁgure 6). It
seems that the estimation is picking up something happening at the tail, but it really
can’t tell what is probability and what is magnitude.
Figure 7 shows the “price of risk” (λ.k). We can see that λ.k < 0 especially from
June-1987 to August-1987 (dates are not shown in the horizontal axis, June to August is
the period with higher risk of a jump down.
Interestingly, in the 2 months right before the crash, the risk of a jump implicit in
option prices is much smaller. Even in the Friday right before the crash, there is no sign
of risks of an immediate collapse of stock prices.
2.2.4 Guimaraes (2007)
Time for me to talk about my own work!
Guimaraes (2007) presents procedure for testing whether currency crises depend on
sunspots or are triggered when the overvaluation hits a threshold.
The idea is the following: if crises are triggered by currency overvaluation crossing a
threshold, the expected magnitude of a devaluation, conditional on its occurrence, is equal
to the threshold value, which may diﬀer substantially from the unconditional expected
currency overvaluation. On the other hand, if crises are triggered by sunspots, uncorre-
lated with the economic variables that determine the exchange rate in a ﬂoating regime,
then the expected magnitude of a devaluation conditional on its occurrence is similar to
the unconditional expected currency overvaluation.
The probability and the expected magnitude of a devaluation are not observable but
can be estimated using data on exchange rate options. Guimaraes(2007) identiﬁes the
probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation of Brazilian Real in the period lead-
33ing up to the end of the Brazilian pegged exchange rate regime and contrasts the estimates
to the predictions from a simple model of currency crises under diﬀerent assumptions
about the trigger.
The model As in Bates (1991), a parametric approach is employed. The asset pricing
model is the following:
Denote by S t h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n ds its logarithm. Initially, the exchange rate follows
a standard Brownian motion with low volatility:
ds = µ1dt + σ1dX
The pegged regime may be abandoned at any time. The interruption is a Poisson event
with hazard rate λ. It leads to a discrete jump in the exchange rate and to a new diﬀusion
process, assumed to last forever.
T h ej u m pi sc o n s t a n t(k):
Safter
Sbefore =( 1+k)
The ﬂoating regime is described by a Brownian motion with drift and higher volatility:
ds = µ2dt + σ2dX
Results The empirical results unveil completely diﬀerent patterns for the probability and
expected magnitude of a devaluation (conditional on its occurrence). The probability was
volatile and mostly driven by contagion from external crises, as the Asian and Russian
crises triggered by far the greatest increases in the probability that the peg would be
abandoned. In contrast, the expected magnitude was stable and entirely unaﬀected by
the Russian episode.
In addition, these data suggest that the Asian and Russian crises negatively impacted
the Brazilian shadow exchange rate. They explicitly show that the crises coincided with
both the greatest increases in the risk of a devaluation in Brazil and the largest depreci-
ations of other Latin American currencies, like the Mexican Peso. Since the crises were
fairly exogenous to the Latin American economies, it is natural to assume that if the
Brazilian currency were allowed to ﬂoat, it would also have depreciated.
Conclusion The empirical ﬁndings favour thresholds and learning over sunspots.
342.2.5 Parametric × non-parametric method
Some advantages of the parametric method:
• it imposes a structure that makes sense economically.
• interpretation of the results is immediate.
• in the non-parametric case, you need to impose some structure anyway (quadratic,
interpolation).
• it is good if there is not much data (market is not so liquid), and if the model is
appropriate.
Some disadvantages of parametric method:
• it imposes a structure that may diﬀer from the true data generating process.
• the parametric model is not exactly what you end up estimating (as you vary λ’s
and µ’s).
• the non-parametric approach may yield accurate results if we have very good data
( o ri fw ed on o th a v eag o o dm o d e l ) .
2.2.6 Extensions
Jondeau and Rockinger (2000) describe alternative methods to infer risk-neutral densities.
Their paper brings a collection of techniques. It is worth discussing a few examples.










• θ: long-run volatility;
• κ: mean-reversion speed;
• γ: volatility of the volatility.
The instantaneous volatility νt is not exactly a parameter, is the realization of a random
variable, but it is natural to estimate it as well.
35Sum of log-normals Another way to imposing some structure in the probability density










That gives us a formula not-much more complicated than the Black-Scholes formula
and we can estimate the implicit parameters.
N o w ,g i v e nt h a tw ew a n tt oi m p o s es o m es t r u c t u r e ,w h a ti sg o o da b o u tt h i so n e ?O r ,
which kind of model could yield some distribution similar to this?
Stochastic interest rate Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) present a model with stochastic
volatitly, jumps (hazard rate is given by Poisson distribution and the size of the jump is
logn-normal) and stochastic interest rate. They estimate the implicit parameters of the
model and check what matters.
2.3 A likelihood test of self-fulﬁlling crises
2.3.1 Jeanne (1997)
Jeanne (1997) executes a likelihood ratio test for the existence of multiple equilibria in
the French Franc crisis. Some unexplainable shifts on expectations seem to be present,
allowing him to conclude that jumps between diﬀerent equilibria were playing a role.
The empirical support for multiple equilibria in his paper comes from the existence of
mysterious changes that fundamentals do not seem to account for.
Setup of the model
• T h ec u r r e n c yi sp e g g e da taﬁxed rate with a foreign currency.
• Policymaker can defend the peg (possibly at some cost) or abandon it. He may be
in:
— “soft” mood, with probability µ: mantains the peg if the net beneﬁto fd o i n gs o
is positive.
— “tough” mood, with probability 1 − µ: maintains the peg whatever is the cir-
cunstance.
H en e e d st h i sc h a n g e si nm o o d st oﬁt better the data, the model would go through
without it.
36• Net beneﬁt of mantaining the peg:
Bt = bt − α.πt−1
where bt is the gross beneﬁto ft h eﬁxed peg and πt−1 is the probability evaluated
by the private sector that the peg will be abandoned next period. So, bt depends on
economic fundamentals but Bt also depends on expectations. We assume that:
bt = φt−1 +  t
where φt−1 = Etbt+1 and  t is an error term.
Equilibria
• The devaluation probability must be equal to the probability that the government is
soft and the net beneﬁto fm a n t a i n i n gt h ep e gi sn e g a t i v e ,t h a ti s :
πt = µ.Pr(Bt+1 < 0)
= µ.Pr( t+1 <α . π t − φt)
= µ.F (α.πt − φt)
There may be multiple equilibria or not, depending on f(0).
Estimation To check for self-fulﬁlling speculation, we need to check if:
1. the estimated parameters satisfy µαf(0) > 1;
2. the estimated fundamental lies in the multiple-equilibrium interval;
3. there is evidence of jumps in the probability of a devaluation accross diﬀerent states.
It is assumed:
πt =ˆ πt + ηt
ˆ πt = µFσ (ˆ πt − φt)
φt = γ
0xt
There are 3 possible equilibria. The equilibrium that is currently being played is











37Now, we can write a likelihood function as a product of (i) the likelihood of the model
prediction and (ii) the likelihood of the state:
L = LηLs
The case of the French Franc The data: he picks some fundamental macro variables
(vector xt). To get ˆ πt, he uses the drift adjustment method of Rose and Svensson (EER
1994) and assumes that the expected magnitude of a devaluation is 5%.
Jeanne (1997) concludes that self-fulﬁlling speculation was at work in the case of the
French Franc (1992-3).
3 Sovereign debt and default
3.1 Models
3.1.1 Arellano (2006)
Arellano’s quantitative analysis builds on Eaton and Gersovitz (RES 1981).
Setup of the model
• Small open economy












• Stochastic endowment: y
• Goverment is benevolent and maximizes utility of households.
• One international asset: one period discount bonds (B).
— Price of bond: q
— Borrowing qB0 implies repayment of B0 next period
— notation: B>0 means positive assets, B<0 means the country is indebted.
38• Government chooses between defaulting or repaying
— no commitment to repay
• If government chooses to repay, the resource constraint is:
c = y + B − qB
0
• Default implies:
— current debts are erased;
— temporary exclusion from international ﬁnancial markets (borrowing and lend-
ing);





• Country re-enters the ﬁnancial market with an exogenous constant probability θ.
• Probability of default: δ
• Creditors are risk-neutral and behave competitively.
— International risk-free interest rate: r












— government starts with assets B, observes realization of endowment y and decides
about repaying or not;
— if the governent decides to repay, borrowing takes place.
— consumers consume.
39The value function depends on whether the country repays or defaults on its debt.
Denote by vc the value function condtional on repayment and by vd the value function
conditional on default.
The government chooses what is best for the agents. Suppose we start the period at























where c = y + B − qB0.
















Equilibrium In a recursive equilibrium:
1. Risk-neutral creditors are indiﬀerent between lending to the domestic country or not
(so q is obtained through the above arbitrage condition).
2. Government maximizes.
3. Households eat.
All the action comes from the government’s decision.
Arellano shows some analytical results (that are already in Eaton in Gersovitz, 1981):
1. Take B1 <B 2. If there is default at state (B2,y), then there is default at state
(B1,y).
2. Suppose that shocks are i.i.d and y1 <y 2. If there is default at state (B,y2),t h e n
there is default at state (B,y1).
3. For a given y, there is a maximum value of B that is incentive compatible to repay.
Computation of equilibrium The problem here is partial equilibrium in the sense that we
do not model the outside world (foreign interest rates are taken as given). However, prices
depend on the probabilities of default (arbitrage condition for the risk-neutral creditors)
40and although the government internalizes the eﬀects of its actions on the price of debt,
we can’t solve for it directly. We have to ﬁnd q as a ﬁxed point – q is a function.
Figure 6 shows the basic structure of an algorythm to compute the equilibrium of the
model.
3.1.2 Guimaraes (2006)
Another opportunity for me to talk about a paper of mine!
Guimaraes (2006) analyses whether sovereign default episodes can be seen as contin-
gencies of optimal international lending contracts. The model considers a small open
economy with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt.
The model An open economy can borrow from abroad, but cannot commit to repay
its debts. The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents whose





Default implies a permanent output cost, γ. The fraction of output lost due to default
is γ, so production is given by:
yt =
(
A.f(kt) ,i fn od e f a u l t
A(1 − γ).f(kt) ,i fd e f a u l t
Default also implies permanent exclusion from international capital markets.
Default costs are permanent, which captures the loss that a country suﬀers by taking
an antagonistic position towards the rest of the world and never repaying its debts. In
the model this is out-of-equilibrium behaviour, which corresponds to never observing such
action in reality.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral lenders that, in equilibrium, lend to the country
as long as the expected return on their assets is not lower than the risk-free interest rate
in international markets, r∗. The price of a bond that delivers one unit of the good next
period with certainty, (1 + r∗)−1, will be denoted q∗. There is a maximum amount of
debt the country can contract that prevents it from running Ponzi schemes but it is never
reached in equilibrium.
Stochastic interest rates Let’s analyze the case of stochastic q∗. The price of a riskless
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Define parameters 
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Figure 6: Flow diagram for Arellano (2006)
42q∗l. A risk-neutral creditor that lends q∗d0 must get an expected repayment equal to d0.
Denote by dh and dl the repayment conditional on high and low state, respectively, and
∆d = dh − dl.I fst−1 = h, a country that borrowed q∗hd0 has debt dh if st = h and dl if
st = l such that dh(1 − ψ)+dlψ = d0. Hence, dh = d0 + ψ∆d and dl = d0 − (1 − ψ)∆d.
If st−1 = l, a country borrowing q∗ld0 has debt dh if st = h and dl if st = l such that
dl(1 − ψ)+dhψ = d0. Hence, dl = d0 − ψ∆d and dh = d0 +( 1− ψ)∆d.
The economy’s ﬂow budget constraint is then given by:
ct + kt+1 =
(
A.f(kt)+( 1− δ)kt − dt + qtdt+1 ,i fn od e f a u l t
A(1 − γ).f(kt)+( 1− δ)kt ,i fd e f a u l t
Where qt is the (endogenously determined) price of debt.
In each period, the central planner chooses between repaying or defaulting. Each option
yields a diﬀerent value function and the planner chooses the maximum of the two:
V (k,d)=m a x{Vpay(k,d),V def(k,γ)}
The value functions conditional on repayment are:
V
h


























0 +( 1− ψ)∆d)
¤ª
where c = Af(k)+( 1− δ)k − k0 − d + qi(k0,d 0)d0.
In case of default, the value function in both states is:
Vdef(k,γ)=m a x
k0 {u((1 − γ)Af(k)+( 1− δ)k − k
0)+βVdef(k
0,γ)}
Equilibrium Taking ﬁrst order approximations of Bellman equations, Guimaraes (2006)
derives analytical expressions for the equilibrium level of debt and the optimal debt con-
tract.
The following result is proven: as we approach a deterministic steady state around,
¯ k, ¯ d and ¯ q,s u c ht h a tq∗h and q∗l are close to ¯ q and ¯ q =
¡
q∗h + q∗l¢
/2,a sl o n ga st h e
borrowing constraint is binding, a linear approximation of the value functions tell us that





1 − β(1 − 2ψ)




The paper claims that debt relief prescribed by the model following the interest rate
hikes of 1980-81 accounts for more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main
Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.
43Stochastic technology In a model with stochastic technology (and constant world interest





1 − β(1 − 2ψ)
Ah − Al
¯ A
Compare both expressions: debt relief generated by reasonable ﬂuctuations in produc-
tivity is at least an order of magnitude below that generated by shocks to world interest
rates.
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